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Up to now, in constructing a language, the procedure has usually been, first to assign a
meaning to the fundamental mathematico-logical symbols, and then to consider what
sentences and inferences are seen to be correct in accordance with this meaning...The
connection [between meaning and inference] will only become clear when approached from
the opposite direction: let any postulates and any rules of inference be chosen arbitrarily;
then this choice, whatever it may be, will determine what meaning is to be assigned to the
fundamental logical symbols.
Rudolph Carnap
The Logical Syntax of Language
0 Introduction
According to an inferential role semantics, the content of a logical expression is determined
by (some aspect of) its inferential role. The inferential role of an expression is a competent
speaker’s disposition to accept the validity of a distinguished set of inferences involving
that expression. The insight, if it is one, is that in a speaker’s reasoning in accordance with
the validity of certain inferences, the logical expression comes to have whatever content is
required for their validity.1 
There are two ways in which inferential role semantics is an unfortunate label. The
term inference is ambiguous. In one sense of the term it refers to an abstract pattern of
argument that is either valid or invalid. Specifically, to say that an inference is valid is to
say that (the proposition expressed by) the conclusion is a logical consequence of (the
propositions expressed by) the premises. There is another sense of the term according to
which an inference is something we do as opposed to an abstract relation among sentences
(and the propositions that they express). It is natural, in this sense, to describe the process
1. Contemporary advocates of inferential role semantics include, inter alia, Block (1986,1993),
Boghossian (1993), Brandom (1994), Field (1977), Harman (1986a,1986b), and Peacocke
(1976,1987,1992). In what follows, I shall not distinguish between meaning and content—none of the
circumstances that requires one to distinguish these notions, such as context sensitivity, obtain with
respect to logical discourse. Boldface  will be used throughout as a device of quasi-quotation.
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of belief fixation as performing an inference.2 In what follows, I shall be using inference in the
former but not the latter sense. Another way in which the label is unfortunate is that
semantics suggests that it is a theory that pairs expressions with semantic values, but an
inferential role semantics is an account of what determines this pairing. Though it is not the
best of names, the use of inferential role semantics is now well entrenched, and I shall follow
that usage here.
I shall argue that given the best explanation of logical understanding, the content of a
logical expression must be determined by its inferential role. This might strike some as
surprising. Why believe logical understanding to be explicable at all? Why isn’t logical
understanding primitive, i.e. , not subject to any further explanation? If logical understanding
were indeed primitive, then this line of argument would be foreclosed. There are two
possible sources for the conviction that logical understanding is primitive. The first, and
least reputable, arises from a general skepticism about the ability of philosophy to explain
anything. Quietism, as such skepticism has come to be known, would preclude an
explanation of logical understanding, for there would be no explanation of anything of
philosophical interest. For present purposes, we may dispense with such skepticism. The
second and more interesting source of the conviction that logical understanding is primitive
involves an initially plausible assumption concerning the form any such explanation must
take. This assumption is that logical understanding should be explained in terms of
propositional knowledge. With the primitivist, I maintain and shall argue that logical
understanding is inexplicable in terms of propositional knowledge. But against the
primitivist, I shall argue that this is not the only available form of explanation. Logical
understanding is explicable not in terms of propositional knowledge but, rather, in terms of
practical knowledge—not knowledge that, but knowledge how. I shall argue that once logical
understanding is conceived as a species of practical knowledge, then the truth of some
version of inferential role semantics is a consequence.
I am not arguing for any particular version of inferential role semantics, but rather,
for the class of such theories. If my argument is cogent, then some version of inferential role
semantics must be correct. But I do not take a stand on which version that is. Moreover, I am
not arguing that inferential role semantics is a correct account of content generally. I am only
arguing that some version of inferential role semantics must be the correct account of the
2. For this reason Harman (1986) has reserved the term implication for the relation of logical
consequence among sentences (and the propositions that they express)—though a similar difficulty
faces Harman’s own choice of terminology. There is a corresponding sense of implication according to
which implying that S is something that a speaker does. What’s important, however, is that the
relevant distinction be clearly marked, not what labels we attach to it.
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content of logical vocabulary .3
1 Content and Inferential Role
What makes it the case that a logical expression has the content that it does? What, for
example, determines the content of x? Certainly not the orthographic properties of the
expression—after all there is nothing semantically significant about a backwards E (unless,
of course, it’s being used as an existential quantifier). So what determines the content of
existential quantification?
According to the inferentialist, the content-determining feature of a logical expression
is (some aspect of) its inferential role, i.e., the disposition of competent speakers to accept the
validity of certain inferences involving that expression.4 Thus, for example, the content of x
is at least partly determined by the disposition to accept as valid inferences of the form:
S(...n...) Þ  xS(...x...)
I say “at least partly” since the disposition to accept the validity of other forms of inference
might also be content-determining. Similarly, the inferentialist might claim that  functions
semantically as disjunction partly in virtue the disposition to accept as valid inferences of
the form:
S Þ  S  S*
Let M be the distinguished set of inferences involving a logical expression L that
3. The discussion will be restricted to the logical vocabulary of complete logics. I believe that
inferential role semantics can be extended to, say, full  first- and second-order logic and modal logic
but special difficulties face an inferential role semantics for these. Thus, for example, Skolem’s
paradox can be transformed into an argument that an inferential role semantics for second-order
logic is committed to the semantic indeterminacy of our second-order idiom. (Suppose that the
content of second-order quantification is fixed by the axioms of second-order logic and the rules of
inference. Very roughly, the problem is that this account of the content of second-order
quantification is consistent with their being subject to not only the standard interpretation but also
to a non-standard interpretation.) And Field (1989, pp. 278–9) has argued that a similar semantic
indeterminacy affects our modal discourse. As interesting as these issues are, they are beyond the
scope of the present essay.
4. Harman (1986a, 1986b) has argued that the disposition to accept the validity of certain
inferences is insufficient to determine logical content. The content of negation, say, is determined as
well by competent speakers’ disposition to accept the inconsistency of certain sets of sentences. There
are thus two components to an expression’s inferential role. However, as nothing in the present
discussion depends on this complexity, I shall ignore it.
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competent speakers are disposed to accept as valid (where M may or may not be a proper
subset of valid inferences involving L). The inferentialist believes that in a speaker’s
accepting the validity of the M-inferences L comes to have whatever content is required for
their validity. 
The inferentialist is committed to, at a minimum, the following supervenience thesis:
The Supervenience Thesis: The content of a logical expression L supervenes on its
inferential role. Specifically, for any metaphysically possible worlds w and w* and
any logical expressions L and L* that are tokened in w and w* respectively, if L and
L* occur in the same distinguished set M of inferences that speakers competent with
these expressions are disposed to accept as valid (in their respective worlds), then L
has the same content in w as L* in w*.5
The supervenience thesis is not by itself a species of reductionism, at least not in the
strong sense of proposing a substantive identification. It claims that logical content
supervenes on inferential role, not that logical content and inferential role should be
identified. It is consistent with the supervenience thesis that the content of a logical
expression and the disposition to accept the validity of the M-inferences be distinct, if
necessarily coextensive, properties. 
The supervenience thesis is fairly weak—it is merely the claim that there could be no
independent variation of logical content and inferential role. I have claimed that, at a
minimum, the inferentialist must accept the supervenience thesis. However, the inferentialist
also claims more than this. The core commitment of inferential role semantics is not just that
the content of a logical expression supervenes on its inferential role, but that it has its
content because of the inferential dispositions of speakers competent with that expression.
Inferential role semantics essentially involves a determination thesis that has the
supervenience thesis as a consequence:
IRS: The content of a logical expression is determined by its inferential role.
Specifically, the fact that a speaker accepts the validity of a distinguished set M of
5. Let me explain what I mean by “the same distinguished set M of inferences.” For present purposes
let inferences be finite sequences of sentences. The initial segment of a sequence consists of the
premises of the inference and the last member of the sequence is its conclusion. Two distinct
expressions occurring in inferences that competent speakers are disposed to accept as valid cannot
participate in identical  sets of inferences. Since the expressions are distinct, so are the sentences of
which they are a part, and thus the inferential sequences in which they occur will themselves be
distinct. That L and L* occur in the same set M cannot mean that they occur in identical sets of
distinguished inferences, rather only that speaker’s competent with these expressions are disposed
to accept as valid the same forms of inference.
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inferences involving L, makes it the case that L has the content required for the
validity of the M-inferences.
Inferential role semantics is usefully thought of as a variant of implicit
definition—with validity instead of truth constraining the content of the definiendum.
Consider the introduction of a novel expression e by means of implicit definition (as
normally understood). Let A be a distinguished set of sentences involving e. The A-
sentences are stipulated to be true and, as a result of such stipulation, competent speakers
become disposed to regard them as true. In being disposed to hold true the A-sentences, e
comes to have the content required for the truth of these sentences. In claiming that the
disposition to hold true the A-sentences implicitly defines e’s content, the advocate of
implicit definition needn’t further claim that the disposition makes the A-sentences true. He
can consistently claim that while the disposition to hold true the A-sentences plays a
content-determining role, their truthmakers constitute an independent domain of fact.
Suppose this procedure did in fact secure a content for e.6 Notice e’s content would then
supervene on the disposition of competent speakers to hold true the A-sentences. Had they
come to regard a distinct set of sentences involving e as true, e would have had a distinct
content—the content required by the truth of those sentences. It is important to emphasize
that the advocate of implicit definition isn’t necessarily committed to a historical claim
about how e was actually introduced into the language. Typically, they are only committed
to the weaker claim that e in fact has the content it would have if it were introduced by
means of implicit definition.7
IRS differs from paradigm cases of implicit definition in that what determines the
content of the definiendum is the validity of a set of inferences, rather than the truth of a set
6. There is no general guarantee that such a procedure will in fact secure a content for e. The content
of the definiendum is supposed to be the one and only one content such that the A-sentences come out
true. There may be more than one such content, or there may be no way to make the A-sentences
jointly true.
7. Thus Lewis (1972/1980, pp. 212–3), having claimed that psychological idiom is implicitly
defined by its role in folk psychology, writes as follows:
Imagine our ancestors first speaking of external things, stimuli, and responses—and perhaps
producing what we, but not they, may call Aüsserungen of mental states—until some genius
invented the theory of mental states, with its newly introduced T-terms, to explain the
regularities among stimuli and responses. But this did not happen. Our common sense
psychology was never a newly invented term-introducing scientific theory—not even in
prehistoric folk-science. The story that mental terms were introduced as theoretical terms
is a myth. It is, in fact, Sellars’ myth of our Rylean ancestors. And though it is a myth, it
may be a good myth or a bad myth. It is a good myth if our names of mental states do in fact
mean just what they would mean if the myth were true. [my emphasis]
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of sentences. The fact that a speaker accepts the validity of the M-inferences, makes it the
case that L has the content required for their validity. The inferentialist, in claiming that
logical content is determined by the disposition to accept the validity of the M-inferences, is
not claiming that the disposition to accept the M-inferences makes them valid. The
inferentialist can consistently claim that while a speaker’s disposition to accept the validity
of certain inferences plays a content-determining role, their validity is an independently
constituted property. Just as e’s content supervenes on competent speakers’ disposition to
hold true certain sentences, so the inferentialist maintains that L’s content supervenes on
competent speakers’ disposition to accept the validity of certain inferences. Had speakers
competent with L been disposed to accept the validity of a distinct set of inferences, L
would have had a distinct content—the content required by the validity of those inferences.8
Moreover, just as the advocate of implicit definition isn’t (necessarily) committed to any
historical claim about how the definiendum was in fact introduced into the language, the
inferentialist needn’t be committed to any similar historical claim.
There is a further parallel between inferential role semantics and implicit definition
as traditionally conceived. The advocate of implicit definition merely claims that the content
of the definiendum is determined by the disposition to hold true certain sentences. He needn’t
make the further claim that the content of the definiendum is identical to the linguistic
disposition that implicitly defines it. There is no obvious inconsistency in believing, say, that
an expression’s content is implicitly defined and that contents are mind- and language-
independent abstracta. Notice if contents are mind- and language-independent abstracta, they
are necessarily distinct from linguistic dispositions that implicitly define them. The claim
that an expression is implicitly defined is a claim about what determines its content and not
a claim about what contents are. Similarly, the inferentialist merely claims that the content
of a logical expression is determined by its inferential role. He needn’t make the further claim
that logical contents are identical to inferential roles.9
8. IRS and the supervenience thesis are thus distinct claims. One can coherently believe the
supervenience thesis while maintaining that logical expressions have their inferential roles
because of their content. Belief in supervenience is consistent even with the denial that there is an
explanatory asymmetry between content and inferential role. Thus while IRS entails the
supervenience thesis, the converse entailment fails.
9. The analogy with implicit definition, though useful, is imperfect—for it obscures two ways in
which an inferential role semantics might be developed. The first conforms closely to the model of
implicit definition. Just as an implicitly defined expression has the descriptive content assigned to
it by its implicit definer, the inferentialist might also claim that logical expressions have
descriptive contents. Roughly speaking, a logical expression L would have the descriptive content:
the logical object that makes the M-inferences valid (where logical objects are truth functions,
quantifiers, and the like). Thus logical expressions with distinct inferential roles would have
distinct descriptive contents even if one and the same logical object satisfies the descriptive
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The inferentialist claims the content of a logical expression is determined by and
hence supervenes on the inferential dispositions of speakers who are competent with that
expression. These claims are only as clear as our understanding of the relevant subvenient
disposition. While I am inclined to believe that the relevant disposition is analytically
primitive, it will be useful to consider what the relevant disposition is not.
I doubt that the disposition to accept the validity of an inference is analytically
reducible to any non-intentional property. Consider an inference that a speaker is disposed
to accept as valid. Let P be the conjunction of its premises, and let C be its conclusion. The
speaker’s disposition to accept the validity of the inference is not, for example, the verbal
disposition to utter C if the speaker is disposed to utter P. The possession of this non-
intentional disposition is neither necessary nor sufficient for being disposed to accept the
validity of the inference. It is not necessary since a competent speaker may accept the
conditions. Conversely, logical expressions with identical inferential roles would have identical
contents. According to this Fregean variant of inferential role semantics, inferential role
individuates  logical content. 
There is, however, a Millian variant of inferential role semantics that disavows this
commitment. According to the Millian variant, a logical expression L would not have the
descriptive content: the logical object that makes the M-inferences valid; rather, L’s content is
exhausted by the logical object that satisfies this description. The descriptive conditions
determined by an expression’s inferential role are not synonymy-supplying, but reference-fixing. The
inferentialist who accepts the Millian variant of inferential role semantics is not in any way
committed to the claim that inferential role individuates logical content. Expressions with distinct
inferential roles can have the same content if the descriptive conditions determined by their
inferential roles are satisfied by one and the same logical object. Moreover expressions with
identical inferential roles need not have identical contents. Suppose the following pair of
expressions have identical inferential roles:
&
¬((¬...)  (¬...))
Suppose further that the inferential role of & determines a descriptive condition that picks out the
truth function associated with conjunction, CONJ. Suppose as well that the inferential roles of ¬ and
 determine descriptive conditions that pick out the truth functions associated with negation, NEG,
and disjunction, DISJ, respectively. Thus whereas the content of & would be the semantically
unstructured two-place truth-function:
CONJ(...,...),
given compositionality, the content of ¬((¬...)  (¬...)) would be the semantically structured two-
place truth-function:
NEG(DISJ(NEG(...),NEG(...)).
These expressions would thus have distinct, if logically equivalent, contents despite having
identical inferential roles.
Despite its implausibility, the Fregean variant is not without its adherents (see for
example Peacocke, 1987). Much of the discussion in the literature, however, seems to unwittingly
vacillate between these distinct positions.
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validity of the inference and even be disposed to assertively utter its premises without
wishing to advertise his conclusion. Nor is it sufficient. A speaker may possess the relevant
verbal disposition while meaning nothing by P and C. Under such circumstances, it would be
wrong, solely on this basis, to interpret the speaker as accepting the validity of the given
inference. (Even a Furby could possess the relevant verbal disposition.) I suspect that similar
difficulties will attend any attempt to analytically reduce the relevant disposition to a non-
intentional property.
Not only is the disposition to accept the validity of an inference not the verbal
disposition to utter C if one is disposed to utter P, neither is it the disposition to infer that C
if one believes that P. (Notice that a speaker’s inferring that C and believing that P are
propositional attitudes and hence that this disposition, unlike the verbal disposition, is not
specified in non-intentional terms.) A speaker may believe that P and accept the validity of
the inference and yet not come to believe that C. The proposition that C may, after all, be
unreasonable given the speaker’s background beliefs, in which case the speaker may be
disposed to disavow the belief that P (or, at the very least, suspend judgement concerning
it).10
Notice, whether or not the speaker comes to believe the conclusion or disavow (or
suspend judgement concerning) one of the premises, his disposition to accept the validity of
the inference is manifest in the fixation of the relevant propositional attitudes. The
disposition to accept the validity of the inference mediated, if not determined, the rational
fixation of belief. While the speaker’s acceptance of the validity of the inference did not
rationally oblige him to believe the conclusion if he believed the premises, it did rationally
prohibit  prohibit him from believing the premise and denying the conclusion. Being disposed
to accept the validity of an inference consists in the ability to reason in accordance with its
validity. Given the (albeit, limited) role it plays in the rational fixation of belief, the relevant
subvening disposition should be understood as an intentional and indeed normative
property (which is not, of course, to say that intentional/normative properties are not
themselves metaphysically reducible to the non-intentional.)
Notice that maintaining the subvenient disposition to be an intentional property in
no way trivializes IRS nor renders it circular as an account of the determinants of logical
content. Although the disposition to accept the validity of an inference is an intentional
property, the account is still non-circular, so long as the disposition can be specified without
10. The present example highlights the way in which the two senses of inference can come apart.
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employing the content property.11
Not only is the disposition to accept the validity of an inference not the disposition
to infer the conclusion if the premises are believed, neither is it the metalinguistic disposition
to believe the inference to be valid. A competent speaker may be disposed to accept the
validity of an inference without being disposed to believe it to be valid for the simple reason
that he fails to grasp the content of validity and so is incapable of forming the relevant
belief. 
Just as I suspect there to be no analytic reduction of the subvenient disposition
framed in non-intentional idiom, I also suspect that there is no analytic reduction of the
notion in intentional terms. For present purposes, I shall regard the disposition to accept the
validity of an inference as an analytically primitive, intentional property. I have no objection
to a metaphysical reduction of this notion if such a reduction is indeed possible. However, I
strongly suspect that no such reduction is forthcoming.
2 Inferential Role and Objectual Truth-Conditions
Call someone who claims, contra the inferentialist, that content determines inferential role, a
representationalist. The representationalist claims that it is because a logical expression has the
content that it does, that speakers competent with that expression are disposed to accept
the validity of  certain inferences. Against the inferentialist he maintains that what is
constitutive of existential quantification is not the fact that competent speakers are
disposed to accept the validity of certain inferences; rather, what is essential to existential
quantification is the objectual truth-conditions of sentences employing such quantifiers.
Specifically, the occurrence of x in the sentence, xS(...x...), functions semantically as an
existential quantifier because its content requires the extension of the sentential matrix to be
non-empty. 
Notice the inferentialist needn’t deny that existential sentences have objectual truth-
conditions—he is merely committed to the weaker claim that if existential sentences have
objectual truth-conditions, they have them in virtue of the inferential role of the constituent
11. Moreover, since the disposition to accept the validity of an inference is an
intentional/normative property, it is at least unobvious that IRS is subject to Kripke’s (1982)
normativity objection to dispositional reductions of content. Kripke’s Wittgenstein argues that since
our non-intentional dispositions to apply an expression fail to determine that we would be justified
in so applying it, facts about its content cannot be identified with any facts about non-intentional
dispositions. For a sympathetic reconstruction of the argument see Boghossian (1989). Some
philosophers have argued that the argument establishes, at best, an epistemological conclusion:
that non-intentional facts fail to determine the intentional facts only in the sense that facts about
content are not a priori consequences of non-intentional facts. For discussion see Byrne (1993, ch. 4),
Horwich (1995), and Soames (1997).
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existential quantifiers. I suspect that the temptation to suppose otherwise is do to not
clearly distinguishing the determination thesis—that logical content is determined by
inferential role—from the stronger reductive thesis—that logical content is identical to
inferential role. If logical contents were inferential dispositions, then they would be distinct
from objectual truth-conditions. Truth-conditions are constraints on the way the world must
be if a sentence or proposition is true. Since truth-conditions essentially involve relations to
extra-linguistic reality, they cannot be identified with anything purely intralinguistic. Thus
one might conclude that inferentialist is committed to  denying that existential sentences
having objectual truth-conditions. However, as I have emphasized, inferential role doesn’t
have to be  logical content in order to determine it. As such, the inferentialist needn’t (for this
reason) deny that existential sentences have objectual truth-conditions. 
The representationalist might have a further worry. The representationalist might
doubt that inferential role suffices to determine objectual truth-conditions. Consider some
logical operator L. If the truth of LxS(...x...) doesn’t require the extension of S(...x...) to be
non-empty, then L is not an existential quantifier—even if L has precisely the same inferential
role as legitimate existential idiom. If there could be an operator that had the same inferential
role as an existential quantifier but differed in content, then the explanatory pretensions of
inferential role semantics are empty.12
More explicitly, the representationalist might argue by reductio ad absurdum:
(1) L functions semantically as an existential quantifier (by hypothesis).
(2) The Supervenience Thesis: The content of a logical expression L supervenes on
its inferential role. Specifically, for any metaphysically possible worlds w and
w* and any logical expressions L and L* that are tokened in w and w*
12. Certain forms of ontological reduction are committed to the envisioned possibility. Consider the
existential sentences of mathematics, say, There is at least one prime number less than 17. It is
plausible that the apparent existential sentences of mathematics have the same inferential role as
genuine existential sentences. Just as competent speakers are disposed to accept as valid the
inference from Paul is a skeptic to There is at least one skeptic, so too are they disposed to accept as
valid the inference from 3 is a prime number less than 17 to There is at least one prime number less
than 17. A speaker who failed to accept the validity of this form of inference would exhibit his
incompetence with the apparent existential idiom of mathematics just as he would in the non-
mathematical case. Certain nominalists claim that, despite having the same inferential role as
legitimate existential idiom, the seeming existential assertions of mathematics are not
ontologically committed to the existence of mathematical entities—their truth-conditions require
the existence nothing. If this were correct, then the apparent existential sentences of mathematics
would lack the objectual truth-conditions of genuine existential sentences despite the identity of
their inferential roles. Anyone who accepts that apparent existential quantification over
mathematical objects has the same inferential role as genuine existential quantification, but
maintains that mathematical truth requires the existence of nothing are committed to the relevant
possibility. For further related discussion see Kalderon (1996), Rosen (1993), and Wright (1983).
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respectively, if L and L* occur in the same distinguished set M of inferences
that speakers competent with these expressions are disposed to accept as
valid (in their respective worlds), then L has the same content in w as L* in
w*.
(3) If L and L* occur in the same set M of inferences that a competent speaker is
disposed to accept as valid, then L and L* must be synonymous or share the
same content (by (2)).
(4) The Standard Explanation: L functions semantically as an existential quantifier
iff: LxS(...x...) is true iff there is an individual in the range of objectual
variable x that is in the extension of S(...x...).
(5) There could be a logical operator L* such that (i) L and L* would occur in the
same set M of inferences that competent speakers are disposed to accept as
valid but (ii) L* would lack the objectual truth-conditions described by the
standard explanation.
(6) Since, by (5), L and L* would occur in the same set M of inferences that
competent speakers are disposed to accept as valid, then, by (3), L* and L
would be synonymous or share the same content.
(7) L* would function semantically as an existential quantifier (by (1) and (6)).
(8) L* would not function semantically as an existential quantifier (by the
standard explanation and (5)).
We have a contradiction, and the representationalist recommends that we avoid it by
rejecting the supervenience thesis. And since the supervenience thesis is a consequence of
IRS, we should reject IRS as well.
It is initially tempting to suppose that the difficulty for the inferentialist lies with
premise (4)—the insistence that legitimate existential sentences have objectual truth-
conditions. However, as I observed earlier, the inferentialist is not committed to denying that
existential sentences have objectual truth-conditions, rather, only to the weaker claim that if
existential sentences have objectual truth-conditions, they have them in virtue of the
inferential role of the ingredient existential idiom. I believe, moreover, that the inferentialist
cannot coherently deny (4). As Kripke (1976, pp. 379–80) has emphasized, the standard
explanation of existential quantification is ultimately couched in terms of the existential
idiom of natural language. As such, there could be no question as to whether the existential
sentences of natural language possess objectual truth-conditions. Objectual truth-conditions
just are the truth-conditions determined by the content of natural language quantifiers. And
if IRS is the correct account of their content, then inferential role could not fail to determine
objectual truth-conditions.
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The real problem for the inferentialist doesn’t consist in the insistence that existential
sentences are subject to the standard explanation and so possess objectual truth-conditions.
Rather, the problem consists in the distinctive modal claim, (5)—that there could be a logical
operator that behaved inferentially just like an existential quantifier but differed in content.
Notice, the envisioned possibility just is the denial of IRS. According to IRS to be an
existential quantifier is to behave like one (where the behavior in question is inferential
behavior). There could be no such operator, at least if IRS is correct. To repeat, it is less the
insistence that existential sentences have objectual truth-conditions, than the insistence that
logical content and inferential role could come apart that is the difficulty posed by the
reductio.
3 The Regress
Why couldn’t there be a logical operator that had the same inferential role as legitimate
existential idiom but wasn’t itself an existential quantifier? Why are logical content and
inferential role necessarily coextensive? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer to this question
will depend on an answer to a prior question: In what does a speaker’s understanding of
existential idiom consist?
3.1 Logical Understanding and Knowledge of Truth-Conditions
The representationalist claims that the content of existential idiom is captured by the
standard explanation and the content described therein determines their inferential role. If
asked in what does a speaker’s understanding of existential idiom consist, the
representationalist might claim that it consists in knowing the standard explanation.13
I suspect that the apparent plausibility of this response is due, in no small part, to a
conflation. There is an ambiguity in our initial question: In what does a speaker’s
understanding of existential idiom consist? Two distinct issues are at stake. The question
might be: How does a speaker attach an expression to a logical content that he can
antecedently entertain? Or the question might be: How can a speaker come to entertain a
logical content that he antecedently could not? So consider a speaker that grasps the content
of existential quantification and so is capable of entertaining existential propositions. (In
what follows I shall be using grasping  and entertaining interchangeably.) The first question
asks what facts about the world establish that he is capable of expressing these
13. Though of course he needn’t. The consequence of dropping this assumption is discussed in section
5.
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propositions by uttering certain sentences. The second question asks what facts about the
world establish that he is capable of entertaining existential propositions in the first place.
The problem of logical understanding, in the sense that shall concern us here, is to determine
the fact in virtue of which a speaker is capable of entertaining a logical content, not in
determining how the speaker comes to express such contents. While knowing the standard
explanation is plausible (at least initially) as an account of how a speaker associates an
expression with the content of existential quantification, it is hopeless as an account of what
it is to grasp that content and so entertain existential propositions—or so is the burden of
this section to show. The temptation to suppose otherwise is due to not clearly
distinguishing these two questions.
We are considering the suggestion that a speaker’s understanding of existential idiom
consists in knowing the standard explanation where understanding, here, is being able to
grasp the content of existential quantification and so entertain existential propositions.
Specifically, grasping the content of x consists in knowing every instance of the standard
explanation: xS(...x...) is true iff there is an individual in the range of the objectual variable
x that is in the extension of S(...x...). This, however, is clearly circular. The
representationalist cannot coherently claim that a speaker could come to entertain the
content of existential quantification by knowing the standard explanation since the
standard explanation presupposes the antecedent intelligibility of existential quantification.
On the standard explanation, an existential sentence is true just in case there is an individual
that is in the extension of the sentential matrix. In order to know the proposition expressed
by the standard explanation the speaker must already be able to entertain the content of
existential quantification (since one can only know propositions that one can entertain). 
One might claim that knowing the standard explanation is not circular as an account
of logical understanding if the quantifier used in the explanation is a distinct expression. Just
as it is legitimate to explain the content of lapin by using a synonymous expression that one
antecedently understands, e.g., rabbit, so it is legitimate to explain the content of object-
level existential quantification in terms of unexplained metalinguistic quantification. But
knowledge of the standard explanation presupposes the antecedent intelligibility of the
metalinguistic quantifier, and, we may fairly ask, in virtue of what is the speaker capable of
entertaining the content of metalinguistic quantification? If, moving up the hierarchy of
metalanguages, the representationalist now claims that the speaker’s understanding of the
metalinguistic quantifier consists in knowing a version of the standard explanation framed
in terms of meta-metalinguistic quantification, then the representationalist faces an infinite
regress, for in what does the speaker’s grasp of meta-metalinguistic quantification consist?
One might claim that knowing the standard explanation is, nevertheless, a good
explanation of the speaker’s understanding of logical vocabulary understood as expressions
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of public language. Understanding the English expression something, for example, is simply
a matter of knowing the standard explanation. It is in virtue of the standard explanation
being (part of) the content of a speaker’s belief or semantic intention that the speaker
understands the public language expression. Of course, the logical contents of the relevant
belief or semantic intention cannot themselves be entertained in virtue of having other beliefs
or semantic intentions on pain of infinite regress. But such an account provides at least a
partial reduction of the problem of logical understanding. 
Even this restricted claim is unwarranted. It, in effect, changes the subject. Recall
logical understanding, in the sense that concerns us here, is a matter of being able to entertain
certain logical contents, not in attaching these contents to expressions of public language. We
don’t want an account that presupposes the speaker’s ability to entertain the relevant
logical content; we want an account of the presupposed ability.
In making this observation I am not thereby committed to the Gricean contention that
linguistic content depends on, and is derived from, mental content. Essentially the same
remark can be made by an advocate of the Sellarsian contention that mental content
depends on, and is derived from, linguistic content, or by the Davidsonian who claims that
linguistic and mental content are interdependent. The general point is that logical
understanding is not a matter of being able to explain the content of some logical expression
(whether a public language expression or some mental expression) in terms of a distinct
expression whose content the speaker can antecedently entertain. Rather, an account of
logical understanding, in the sense that concerns us here, is an account of the antecedent
grasp of logical content presupposed by such explanations. 
The regress is perfectly general in that it relies on no feature specific to existential
quantification. Consider, for example, the standard explanation of conjunction:
S & S* is true iff S is true and S* is true.
If someone were to claim that entertaining the content of conjunction consists in knowing the
standard explanation of conjunction, then such an account would itself be circular or subject
to an infinite regress. The regress provides us with a general method for arguing against any
proposal to the effect that our ability to entertain a logical content consists in knowledge of
truth-conditions.
One might be tempted to avoid the regress by making the following observation. It is
inessential that the standard explanation of existential quantification be formulated in terms
of metalinguistic existential quantification. One can reformulate the standard explanation in
terms of negation and universal quantification:
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xS(...x...) is true iff it is not the case that for all individuals i in the range of the
objectual variable x i is not a member of the extension of S(...x...).
Similarly, the standard explanation of conjunction can itself be reformulated in terms of
negation and disjunction:
S & S* is true iff it is not the case that (S is false or S* is false).
The problem is that this merely postpones the inevitable. For whatever choice of logical
primitives the question will always arise: In virtue of what is the speaker capable of
entertaining their content?
With respect to determining what it is to entertain logical content, knowledge of the
standard explanation is hopeless as an account. Specifically, it faces the following dilemma:
It is either circular (since such knowledge presupposes the antecedent ability to entertain the
relevant contents) or it is subject to an infinite regress. Indeed it should be emphasized that
the temptation to avoid circularity and thereby embrace the regress is due to not clearly
distinguishing the ambitious project of determining the fact in virtue of which a subject can
entertain a logical content from the more modest project of determining how a subject can
attach an expression to a logical content that he can antecedently entertain.14
3.2 Logical Understanding and Knowledge of Content
It is worth emphasizing that the problem for the representationalist is not due to an overly
narrow focus on truth-conditions. Knowledge of content, as opposed to mere truth-
conditions, fares no better as an account of what it is to entertain a logical content. Consider
the following revision of the standard explanation:
14. The representationalist might maintain that knowledge of the standard explanation is
nevertheless an adequate account of how speakers associate expressions with logical contents that
they can antecedently entertain. I believe even this more modest claim is false. As Foster (1976) and
Soames (1989) have argued, knowledge of truth-conditions is not sufficient for understanding in the
relevant sense since such knowledge is consistent with false beliefs about content. Someone could
know that Il y a des lapins is true iff there are individuals in the extension of des lapins without
understanding the French sentence. Indeed it is consistent with such knowledge that the subject
believes that Il y a des lapins expresses the proposition that there are rabbits and arithmetic is
incomplete. Since knowledge of truth-conditions is compatible with false beliefs about content, such
knowledge is insufficient for understanding even in the modest sense.
Soames (1989) has further argued that knowledge of truth-conditions is not necessary
either. It is plausible that a child can come to understand sentences of his native language before he
can entertain the content of a truth predicate, in which case he would be incapable of such
knowledge. For an independent argument that one must be able to entertain propositional contents
prior to grasping the content of a truth predicate see Kalderon (1997).
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The Revised Standard Explanation: x functions semantically as an existential
quantifier iff xS(...x...) expresses the proposition that $ xS(...x...).
The current suggestion on behalf of the representationalist is that a speaker’s ability to grasp
the content of existential quantification and so entertain existential propositions consists in
knowing every instance of the revised standard explanation: xS(...x...) expresses the
proposition that $ xS(...x...). Notice, however, that such knowledge presupposes the
speaker’s ability to entertain the content of existential quantification. The problem is that in
order to entertain the content of a that-clause one must be able to entertain the proposition
expressed by the embedded sentence. Thus, in order to know an instance of the revised
standard explanation the speaker must already be capable of entertaining existential
propositions (since one can only know propositions that one can entertain). Any such
account would clearly be circular. 
Nor would it help to observe that a speaker can designate propositions in ways that
do not require the capacity to entertain them by, for example, naming them. Consider a
speaker that knows no French. Suppose further that due to some educational
impoverishment he has yet to grasp the content of rabbit. Since he cannot entertain this
content neither can he entertain propositions about rabbits. Nevertheless we can teach him
to designate the proposition that there are rabbits in the following fashion: We stipulate that
Gavagai refers to the proposition that competent French speakers normally express by
assertively uttering Il y a des lapins (where the stipulation is reference-fixing, not synonymy
supplying). Given his competence with Gavagai, the speaker could, for example, entertain
the proposition expressed by The truth of Gavagai surprises and delights Bernice despite
his inability to entertain the named proposition. What this example shows is that it is
possible to designate propositions that one cannot entertain. It is thus possible to entertain a
proposition with a propositional constituent that is not itself entertainable.15 
Can the representationalist exploit this fact to give a non-circular reformulation of
the revised standard explanation? The revised standard explanation might be reformulated
as follows:
x functions semantically as an existential quantifier iff xS(...x...)  expresses p
(where p is schematic letter whose permissible substituends are names for existential
15. In addition to naming propositions, one can designate propositions that one cannot entertain by
quantifying over or describing them. For further discussion see Soames (1989) and Kalderon (1997).
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propositions). Suppose now, not that the speaker is incapable of entertaining propositions
about rabbits, but rather that he is incapable of entertaining existential propositions. The
representationalist might maintain that the speaker could come to grasp the content of
existential quantification and so entertain existential propositions by knowing, among other
things, that there are rabbits expresses Gavagai. While clearly avoiding the charge of
circularity, it ought also to be clear that circularity is avoided at the cost of providing no
account whatsoever of a speaker’s grasp of existential quantification. Ex hypothesi, knowing
that there are rabbits expresses Gavagai doesn’t require that one grasp the content of
existential quantification. Reformulating the revised standard explanation by designating
propositions in ways that do not require that one can entertain them has the consequence
that knowledge of instances of the revised standard explanation is insufficient for grasping
the content of existential quantification.
The difficulty for the representationalist, then, is not just the relatively parochial
problem that a speaker’s grasp of the content of existential quantification (and his
consequent ability to entertain existential propositions) could not consist in an explicit
representation of objectual truth-conditions—neither could it consist in an explicit
representation of the content of existential quantification. The problem is perfectly general:
Either such a representation presupposes the antecedent ability to entertain the logical
content and is thus circular, or it makes an essential reference to a further representation and
is thus subject to an infinite regress. 
The present considerations suggest a stronger and more general conclusion. Grasping
the content of an expression is not a propositional attitude. Propositional attitudes are, of
course, relations to propositions, but one can only adopt an attitude toward a proposition
that one can entertain. Grasping a content could not itself be a propositional attitude; for
insofar as propositional attitudes are representational, a speaker’s having a propositional
attitude already involves a grasp of its content. If grasping is not a propositional attitude,
then any explanation of it in terms of propositional knowledge is no explanation at all.16
16. The regress argument is not without historical antecedents. It is a variant of Quine’s 1935
argument in “Truth by Convention.” There Quine argues that linguistic conventions cannot determine
the content of our logical vocabulary. Roughly the problem is that in order to explicitly state the
convention one must deploy the very vocabulary whose content the convention was supposed to
determine. And if the logical vocabulary used in the statement of the convention are distinct
expressions whose contents are themselves determined by further conventions, then we have a
beginning of an infinite regress. 
It has, perhaps, been insufficiently appreciated how Quine’s argument in “Truth by
Convention” anticipates Wittgenstein’s regress of interpretation argument. Wittgenstein argues
that following a rule cannot consist in possessing an explicit representation of the dictates of that
rule. For such a representation must itself be rule-governed, and if following a further rule is a
matter of possessing yet another representation, then we are off on an infinite regress. And thus
Wittgenstein writes (1945/1968, §201): “What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule
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4 From Logical Understanding to Logical Content
The ability to grasp the content of existential quantification (and so entertain existential
propositions) could not consist in knowledge of objectual truth-conditions. Nor could it
consist in knowledge of the content of existential quantification. Nor, would it seem, could it
consist in a competent speaker’s having any other propositional attitude. In what then does
logical understanding consist? 
These difficulties might encourage the conviction that logical understanding is
primitive, i.e., not subject to further explanation. But does the regress in fact justify belief in
primitive logical understanding? Only if we assume that logical understanding, if explicable
at all, should be explained in terms of propositional knowledge—for it is a consequence of
the regress that no such explanation is tenable. But this is not the only form such an
explanation can take. I believe the reason speakers competent with existential idiom, say,
are disposed to accept the validity of existential generalization is that their competence
consists precisely in their having this (and perhaps other) inferential dispositions. A
speaker’s grasp of logical content doesn’t consist in any propositional knowledge but rather
in his practical knowledge—grasping the content of logical expression is a matter of knowing
how to reason in accordance with the validity of the M-inferences. If an explanation of
logical understanding in terms of practical knowledge were to survive the regress, then belief
in primitive logical understanding would be rationally unmotivated.
An inferentialist account of logical understanding is committed, at a minimum, to the
following supervenience thesis:
For any metaphysically possible worlds w and w*, and any speakers A and B that
exist in w and w* respectively, if there are expressions LA and LB such that A and B
are disposed to accept the validity of the same set M of inferences involving LA and
LB, then A and B grasp the same logical content.
 
The supervenience thesis is fairly weak—it is merely the claim that there could be no
independent variation of logical understanding and inferential role. The inferentialist claims
more than this. According to the inferentialist the relevant inferential dispositions determine
which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call ‘obeying the rule’ and ‘going
against it’ in actual cases.” The regress of interpretation argument is itself a generalization of
Quine’s argument against logical conventionalism.
Notable as well is Ryle’s (1949, ch. 2) argument that any attempt to reduce practical
knowledge to propositional knowledge is subject to an infinite regress.
18
a speaker’s grasp of logical content.
What is the nature of the determination relation? Recall the inferentialist offered a
semantic explanation of the supervenience of logical content on inferential role. Logical
content supervenes on inferential role because, roughly speaking, the disposition to accept
the validity of the M-inferences implicitly defines L’s content. Unfortunately, no
corresponding semantic explanation is available for the supervenience of logical
understanding on inferential role. Here, unlike the case of inferential role semantics, I am
inclined to believe the stronger reductive thesis. That is, while I believe logical content to be
distinct from the relevant inferential dispositions, I am inclined to believe that logical
understanding just is the possession of the relevant inferential dispositions:
Inferential Competence: A speaker’s ability to grasp a logical content just is his
disposition to accept the validity of the M-inferences involving a logical expression L
(where L is either a linguistic or mental expression).17
Notice that the capacity to reason in accordance with the validity of an inference,
though an intentional property, does not itself involve the content the grasp of which it
determines. According to Inferential Competence, a speaker’s ability to entertain a logical
content does not require him to represent that content. Inferential Competence avoids the
regress precisely in virtue of this denial. 
Insofar as the relevant inferential dispositions do not themselves involve the target
content property, Inferential Competence is not circular. But why think that it is an account
of logical understanding at all? What is it about our knowing how to reason in accordance
with the validity of certain inferences that determines our grasp of logical content?18 The
17. It is worth pointing out that on the Millian variant of inferential role semantics there will be
more than one way to grasp a logical content. Recall on the Millian variant, the inferential role of
an expression L determines a descriptive condition, and L’s content is the logical object that satisfies
the description. While distinct inferential roles will determine distinct descriptions, it is possible
that expressions with distinct inferential roles have identical contents since the descriptions
determined by inferential role are reference-fixing, not synonymy-supplying. But if being disposed
to accept the validity of the M-inferences is what it is for a speaker to grasp L’s content, then there
will be more than one way to grasp that content. While something of a heresy in Fregean semantics,
the claim that there is more than one way to grasp a content is not implausible. For a useful related
discussion see Fodor (1998, pp. 16–7).
18. Recall the account of logical understanding in terms of knowledge of the revised standard
explanation. The claim was that a speaker grasps the content of existential quantification and is
thereby capable of entertaining existential propositions by knowing every instance of the revised
standard explanation: xS(...x...)  expresses the proposition that $ xS(...x...). The account is, of
course circular, if existential propositions are denoted by that-clauses, but not if they are instead
named—for naming propositions allows one to designate propositions that one cannot entertain.
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inferentialist is well placed to answer this question for he maintains that the inferential
dispositions of competent speakers do double duty—they at once constitute the competence
of such speakers and determine the contents which they entertain. A speaker grasps the
content of a logical expression by being disposed to accept the validity of certain inferences
because this disposition implicitly defines the expression’s content. Knowing how to reason
in accordance with the validity of certain inferences imposes constraints on a logical
expression’s content sufficient to determine that content. It is for this reason that such
practical knowledge is a good candidate for being that in which logical understanding
consists.
According to the inferentialist, a speaker’s ability to entertain a logical content
consists in his disposition to accept the validity of certain inferences involving a logical
expression (whether of public language or some mental expression). Inferential Competence
survives the regress by denying that grasping a logical content involves the possession of an
explicit representation of that content. Moreover, it would seem that one cannot reasonably
believe that a speaker’s ability to entertain a logical content consists in his disposition to
accept the validity of the M-inferences without also believing that this disposition
determines the very content that the speaker can entertain. If that’s right, then a commitment
to Inferential Competence carries with it a commitment to IRS. Not only do I believe that
Inferential Competence survives the regress argument, but I also believe that it is the only
fully adequate account of logical understanding that can. The case here should be
understood as a challenge: Give some other account of logical understanding that survives
the regress, or accept Inferential Competence. 
If Inferential Competence is forced on us (and, with it, IRS), then (5) must be false
and the reductio unsound. Recall the representationalist attempted to undermine IRS by
envisioning an operator that participated in the same set M of inferences that speakers
competent with existential idiom are disposed to accept as valid but lacked the appropriate
truth-conditions. If, however, a speaker’s ability to entertain the content of existential
quantification consists in his disposition to accept the validity of the M-inferences, and this
disposition is content-determining, then (5) must be false—there could be no operator that
behaved inferentially just like an existential quantifier but differed in content.
5 Could Logical Understanding Consist in an Implicit Grasp of Truth-Conditions?
Once the schema is so reformulated, knowledge of its instances does not require the ability to
entertain existential propositions. The proposal avoided the regress at the cost of providing no
account whatsoever of logical understanding. The present worry is of a piece. Inferential
Competence is not circular as an account and so too avoids the regress, but perhaps at the cost of
providing no account of logical understanding.
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The representationalist might feel up to the challenge posed above. Specifically he might
object as follows: If Inferential Competence survives the regress by claiming that a speaker’s
grasp of a logical content is determined by some implicit feature of his inferential usage, why
couldn’t the representationalist make a similar claim on his own behalf? He can agree that
the regress establishes that logical understanding could not consist in an explicit
representation of truth-conditions. But he could argue that logical understanding consists in
an implicit grasp of truth-conditions.
In assessing this objection, let’s begin by examining what this implicit grasp of truth-
conditions could consist in. The representationalist might claim that it consists in a
speaker’s disposition to unhesitatingly accept certain elementary logical truths involving the
target logical expression. The disposition to hold true certain sentences counts as an implicit
grasp of truth-conditions because this disposition implicitly defines the content of the logical
expression.
Corresponding to every inference in the set M is a conditional whose antecedent
consists of the conjunction of its premises and whose consequent consists in its conclusion.
Thus corresponding to instances of existential generalization are conditionals of the form:
If S(...n...), then $ xS(...x...)
Given this observation, the representationalist might develop the present suggestion as
follows: A speaker’s implicit grasp of objectual truth-conditions consists, at least in part, in
his disposition to unhesitatingly accept all conditionals of this form. Logical understanding
consists in an implicit grasp of truth-conditions, and this implicit grasp, in turn, consists in a
speaker’s disposition to hold true conditionals corresponding to valid inferences involving
the target logical operator. This disposition counts as an implicit grasp of truth-conditions
since it implicitly defines the content of the logical expression. In holding true certain
distinguished sentences, the logical expression comes to have whatever content is required
for their truth. On this proposal, the speaker’s logical understanding consists in his
disposition to hold true certain sentences, not in the speaker’s disposition to accept certain
inferences as valid. The representationalist can consistently claim that while the acceptance
of certain sentences plays a role in determining the content of these sentences, it is
independently constituted facts which makes these sentences true (given that they have
those contents).
It is worth emphasizing one commitment of any such account. The representationalist
who adopts such an account is committed to denying that there could be a logical operator
L* that participates in the same set M of inferences as L but differed in content. If an
implicit grasp of truth-conditions consists in holding true conditionals corresponding to
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valid inferences in which L occurs, then there could be no logical operator L* that
participates in the same set M of inferences but differed in content. A speaker’s implicit
grasp of the content of L* would consist in his disposition to hold true precisely the same
conditionals that he is disposed to hold true of L. But if holding true certain sentences is
content-determining, then L and L* must share the same content. The representationalist can
only avoid the regress by rendering the reductio unsound.
Recall, the raison d’être of representationalism consists in the claim that content
determines inferential role. The representationalist claims that it is because a logical
expression has the content that it does, that speakers competent with that expression are
disposed to accept the validity of the M-inferences. How would logical content determine
inferential role if logical content is itself determined by the holding true of certain elementary
logical truths? Suppose that one of the speaker’s content-determining dispositions with
respect to the conditional, , is his disposition to hold true conditionals of the form:
If S ®  S* and S, then S*
How in terms of this are we to explain the speaker’s disposition to accept the validity of the
following inference:
S  S*, S Þ  S*?
One might be tempted to claim that given the premises of the inference:
S ®  S*
S  
and the conditional: 
If S ®  S* and S, then S*
the conclusion of the inference follows by modus ponens. But notice any such explanation
itself presupposes the speaker’s disposition to accept the validity of the inference—indeed
the very disposition it was supposed to explain.19 The explanation relies on being
antecedently disposed to accept the validity of the inference and is thus circular.
19. This is, in effect, the problem posed to Achilles by the Tortoise in Lewis Carroll’s (1895) “What
the Tortoise said to Achilles.” (Though Carroll himself seems not to be able to see clear of this
problem.) For a useful discussion see Thomson (1960).
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It might be objected that I am ignoring the resources that are available to the
representationalist. If holding true certain sentences genuinely constitutes an implicit grasp
of truth-conditions, then valid inference can be explained à la Tarski in terms of the
machinery of model-theoretic semantics. Given a description of the truth-conditions of S 
S*, S and S* one can establish that there is no model M and assignment function s relative
to which S  S*and S are true and S* is false.
Consider then a simple language consisting of names, predicates, and truth-
functional connectives. A model is a specification of non-empty set plus an assignment of
denotations from that set to the non-logical vocabulary. Specifically, the denotations of
names will be elements of the set, and the denotations of n-place predicates will be n-tuples
of elements of the set. Given the notion of a model we can inductively define the notion of
truth in a model as follows:
(a) A name n denotes an individual i relative to a model M and assignment
function s iff M and s assign i to n.
(b) An n-place predicate P applies to an n-tuple of individuals relative to a
model M and assignment function s iff the n-tuple is in the set M and s assign
to P.
(c) An atomic sentence P(n1,...,nn) consisting of an n-place predicate P and n
names n1,...,nn is true relative to a model M and assignment function s iff P
applies to an n-tuple of individuals <i1,...,in> that are denoted by n1,...,nn
respectively relative to M and s.
(d) A sentence ¬S is true relative to a model M and assignment function s iff S is
not true relative to M and s.
(e) A sentence S  S* is true relative to a model M and assignment function s iff
it is not the case that (S is true relative to M and s) and (S* is false relative to
M and s).
Given the notion of truth in a model one can define the notion of logical consequence as
follows:
A sentence S is a logical consequence of a set of sentences P (the inference from the
sentences in P to S is valid) iff there is no model and assignment function relative to
which every sentence in P is true and S is false.
We are supposing that in virtue of the fact that a speaker is disposed to hold true
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certain distinguished sentences,  has whatever content is required for the truth of these
sentences. We are further supposing that the implicitly defined content of  is such that
clause (e) is an adequate representation of that expression’s truth-conditional content. The
representationalist claims that we can explain the speaker’s disposition to accept the
validity of the inference from {S  S*, S} to S* in terms of such a content. What form would
such an explanation take? 
It is tempting to suppose that the explanation would involve a metalinguistic proof
that S* is a logical consequence of {S  S*, S}. According to the definition of logical
consequence, S* is a logical consequence of {S  S*, S} just in case there is no model and
assignment function relative to which S  S* and S is true and S* is false. Consider all the
models relative to which S is true and S* is false. Given clause (e), the conditional S  S* is
false relative to such models since these are models in which the antecedent is true and the
consequent false. It follows that there are no models relative to which S  S* and S is true
and S* is false, and hence that S* is a logical consequence of {S  S*, S}.
To complete the explanation the representationalist would have to make the
following epistemological assumptions. A competent speaker knows that: S  S* is true iff
it is not the case that S is true and S* is false. Given this knowledge, he would be disposed
to accept the model-theoretic representation of this fact. Specifically, if he knows what a
model is, then given his knowledge of truth-conditions, he could know that a sentence S 
S* is true relative to a model M and assignment function s iff it is not the case that S is true
relative to M and s and S* is false relative to M and s. Suppose further that the speaker
knows the model-theoretic definition of logical consequence. That is, the speaker knows that
a sentence S is a logical consequence of a set of sentences P iff there is no model and
assignment function relative to which every sentence in P is true and S is false. Given this
knowledge, the speaker could give the metalinguistic proof sketched above, and thereby
come to know that S* is a logical consequence of {S  S*, S}. If the speaker comes to know
this fact about logical consequence, then the speaker would consequently be disposed to
accept the validity of modus ponens.
I believe that skepticism is warranted concerning this overly rationalistic explanation
of a speaker’s inferential dispositions. But it suffices to observe that the explanation is only
cogent if the speaker is disposed to accept the validity of the metalinguistic inference. The
explanation of validity in terms of truth in a model itself presupposes the speaker’s
acceptance of the validity of certain metalinguistic inferences, and, we may fairly ask, in
virtue of what is the speaker disposed to accept their validity? The appeal to the model-
theoretic representation of validity is less an advance than a detour.
I suspect that the representationalist may have been misled by failing to clearly
distinguish between validity and the acceptance of validity. Validity is, of course, definable
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in terms of logical content. The key idea of Tarski’s definition of logical consequence is that
an inference is valid iff holding the content of the logical vocabulary fixed, there is no way to
interpret the non-logical vocabulary such that the premises are true and the conclusion is
false. This may encourage the thought that the acceptance of validity is itself ultimately
explainable in terms of logical content. But validity and the acceptance of validity are
distinct properties—it is possible for someone to accept the validity of an inference that is in
fact invalid. And if the considerations of the present section are to be believed, the
acceptance of validity is inexplicable in terms of logical content.
In general, while one apparently avoids the regress by claiming that logical
understanding consists in an implicit grasp of truth-conditions, one’s success is only
apparent. For the regress will return when it comes to explaining how logical content, so
conceived, determines inferential role.
6 Conclusion
I have argued that if a speaker’s ability to entertain a logical content is constituted by his
disposition to accept the validity of the M-inferences involving some logical expression
(whether it be a linguistic or mental expression), then the content of that expression is itself
determined by this inferential disposition. I have further argued that this account of logical
understanding survives the regress described in §3 since grasping a logical content is not a
matter of possessing an explicit representation of its content. More than that, I have
suggested that this is the only fully adequate account of logical understanding that can. The
case here should be understood as a challenge: Give some other account of a speaker’s
ability to grasp the content of a logical expression or accept the account offered here. If the
challenge cannot be met, then the advertised conclusion stands—given the nature of our
understanding, some version of inferential role semantics must be the correct account of the
determinants of logical content.20
20. I would like to thank Paul Benacerraf and the participants of the University of California,
Riverside faculty seminar for comments on an earlier version of this material. Special thanks are
due to Fiona Cowie, James Pryor, and Mike Thau for their many helpful suggestions.
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